Argument: Ethics as the supernatural and miracles and the possibility of God

Ok, I am going to try to keep this brief so as to get the core idea concisely. I'll openly admit at the outset that my method of philosophical argumentation is much like my style of street and trail cycling, which I often describe as being a barbarian on two wheels.

I should also add that I honestly did come to this argument on my own as far as I can recollect, but I would not be surprised if philosophers much more erudite etc than myself had formulated it long ago. If anybody reads this and knows of somebody else who said it before I did, please share it in the comments (I'll try to figure out how to make sure they are turned on ... I think they are as long as you have a blogger account or a gmail account to sign your comment with, but I will try to check if there are any settings on my blog dashboard end of things).

I used to (try to) cover this material/argument with college freshmen when discussing T. H. Huxley on the supernatural.

This is not, in its nature, an argument for the existence of God. It is as argument that if you hold to ethics in any form whatsoever, then you have already accepted:
1. the actuality of the supernatural in general
2. the actuality of miracles (the supernatural directly controlling the natural)
3. the possibility of God

Again, this isn't an argument for the existence of God, simply an "if, then" argument. I had one student talking to me after class, and she said that she has no problem seeing all of her actions as determined. As a college instructor, I had to say that, in the context of us talking about the class material, that was fine, as long as she understood the argument I was making (which she did, she was one of the few ... really bright)

So, the argument: If you believe in any form of ethics you have already accepted the supernatural, miracles, and the possibility of the existence of one highest supernatural, personal in nature, called God.

Ethics is defined by the word "ought" or "should," based in three concepts: (1) there is some event within the system of determination we call "nature" that is not determined in its actualization, (2) there is something outside the system of determination surrounding that event that can impact the material outcome of that event, and (3) there is some code in which the "ought" is based.

For class, I used to describe three kinds of "ought"s. The "scientific" says simply that the hypothesis is a best guess; the information is never complete, so a theory is always a guess at what "should" happen within certain control parameters in an experiment or how the outcome will change if you alter those parameters in certain ways. The "pragmatic" out simply says that if you want these results you "should" use that method. The example I always gave was lifting weights: if you want bulk, do high weight at low reps, but if you want tone, do low weight at high reps ... but there is no real declaration on which you should want. But the "ethical" ought, this one does get to bigger questions of what you should want, and the capacity for choosing as a free-will agent.

The supernatural that you have accepted is called the human free will. In order for ethics to make any sense at all, you have to believe that the person whom you are telling they should act in a certain way has the capability to choose acting one way rather than another. That places their action outside the system of determinacy we call "nature." I would argue that most people who advocate ethical action accept it in this sense, even though many people who try to believe in ethics from an atheistic/anti-supernatural standpoint would try the procrustean bed project of trying to fit their ethical beliefs into the category of a "scientific" or "pragmatic" "ought."

The miracle you have accepted is that this undetermined thing (the free will) has entered into and directly manipulated or controlled elements within the system of determination, even in ways that go contrary to the progress of the system of determination as dictated by the forces in play up to the moment of interference. We may not be able to see all the factors at play (and, indeed, we never can see all of them) to verify the ways in which the new course initiated varies form what would have happened if governed simply by the factors within the system of determination, but by its very nature and logic, the free will must alter the results in that system somehow (otherwise there would be no need for an ethical "ought").

The possibility for the existence of God (and therefore of God's miracles) flows naturally. People may have an aversion to the "super" in "supernatural," but once you have opened the door for the "extra-natural," anything outside the system of determination (as I have been discussing, the human free will), you have opened the door to, at the very least, the possibility of the existence of the "supernatural" and a highest, singular supernatural being who might be, like the humans that you began your investigation, personal in nature.

If all of this (belief in God, belief in miracles, belief in the existence of "logic" and the possibility that my argument conforms to it) is said to be simply ephemeral, epi-phenomenal sensation, then so is the impression of ethical obligation of any kind.